

**Jerzy Sielski, Jan Długosz Academy**

## **Stereotypes of Jews in Poland in the Context of Political Antisemitism**

The perception of ethnic minorities and nationalities has its own longstanding tradition. The stereotype of Jews is linked to the phenomenon of antisemitism.

One of the most well-known definitions of antisemitism belongs to Jean-Paul Sartre: "Antisemitism seeks to find, in the existence of Jews, the cause of all or some failures, personal and collective; and the belief that it is possible to solve problems through partially or totally depriving Jews of their rights, through excluding them from the economy and society, driving them out of the country or even extermination"<sup>1</sup>.

Alina Cała proposes a wider definition in her monograph *Żyd - wróg odwieczny? Antysemityzm w Polsce i jego źródła* (*The Jew – the Eternal Enemy? Antisemitism in Poland and Its Sources*):

Antisemitism – an ideology, a world view or political current, containing a complex prejudice, justifying a hostile attitude to Jews. The formation of the concept of nationalism and totalitarianism was based on a tradition of anti-Judaism. Sometimes, it is referred to as racism, incorrectly singling out Jews as an anthropological race. In a broader sense – the defining of social attitudes, manifesting themselves in a world view in which an important role is played by aggression, verbal or physical, disapproving generally of and showing prejudice against Jews, and justifying such conduct through religious, nationalist, racist, political or economic reasons<sup>2</sup>.

Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, in his book *Hitler's Willing Executioners, Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust*, in which he tries to understand the conduct and mentality of thousands of Germans who became the perpetrators of genocide, distinguishes three dimensions of antisemitism<sup>3</sup>.

The first is connected to the perception, by antisemites, of harmful characteristics within Jews, namely that Jews are useless and cause harm. It could be through race, culture or habits, or cultural patterns.

The second dimension – to what extent the antisemite engages in contemplation about Jews. When antisemitic views do not concern Jews very often, Goldhagen states that this is secret antisemitism. When the subject of Jews is the main inspiration in the everyday thinking of antisemites, then it is possible to say that antisemitism has an open character.

The third dimension concerns the harmfulness of Jews. That is, the manner in which the antisemite sees danger from the Jews' side – a conspiracy in order to take over the world, a country, a city, a village, the economy, courts, politics and the like.

<sup>1</sup> Cyt. za A. Całą, *Żyd - wróg odwieczny? Antysemityzm w Polsce i jego źródła*, Wyd. Nisza Warszawa 2012, p. 30.

<sup>2</sup> A. Cała, *Żyd - wróg odwieczny? Antysemityzm w Polsce i jego źródła*, Wyd. Nisza Warszawa 2012, p. 31.

<sup>3</sup> D. J. Goldhagen, *Gorliwi kaci Hitlera. Zwyczajni Niemcy i Holocaust*. Wyd. Prószyński i S-ka, Warszawa 1999, p. 38 i n.

In literature on the subject, different types of antisemitism are distinguished<sup>4</sup>:

1. Social antisemitism – displaying the negative features of the stereotypes and the large social gap from the Jews.
2. Political antisemitism – the political control stereotype, very often the stereotype being the source of pogroms.
3. Religious antisemitism – blaming Jews for the death of Christ.
4. Racist antisemitism – assigning Jews a degenerate nature, psyche or character.

H. Datner-Śpiewak proposes another division<sup>5</sup>. This researcher considers that, in Poland, there are two different types of antisemitism: traditional, based on religious dislike (deicide), or modern, linked to the conviction that, in Poland and around the world, Jews have too much influence in politics, economics and on the mass media.

In this work, we will concentrate, above all, on political antisemitism in Poland or, as H. Datner-Śpiewak proposes, modern antisemitism.

### **Stereotypes and Political Antisemitism**

National and ethnic minorities, as a rule, differ racially, ethnically, culturally, linguistically or religiously from the dominant nation in a given state. Their cultural, linguistic and religious dissimilarity gives rise to prejudice, or even racial, religious or political hatred. Hence, minority groups become a sitting target for the authorities, as well as for the dominant nation, to exploit as a substitute object for the venting of frustrated aggression in times of political or economic crisis. The Jewish minority, living within Polish territory, was just such a substitute object, both in the past, as well as after the regaining of independence in 1918, and following the Second World War.

The Jewish community in Poland, as well as around the world, often acts in two roles. One is as a group holding power and, at the same time, aspiring to world domination - "the conspiracy theory". The second is as a group which acts as a scapegoat for the authorities and for the dominant nation. In one instance, it is portrayed as a strong dominating structure. In the other, it is portrayed as a weaker group, capable of being humiliated and of being blamed for all failures. I have discussed these two forms of political antisemitism in an earlier article entitled *Political Conditioning in Poland After World War II and National Minorities, With the Jewish Community as an Example*<sup>6</sup>.

In this article, I would like to present stereotypes which are associated with political antisemitism, moulded in Poland, both before and after the regaining of independence in 1918. The first stereotype associated with political antisemitism was the "Jew-Revolutionary". The next stereotype which can be singled out was the "Jew-Bolshevik", which was transformed into the "Jew Communist". All these outlined stereotypes were connected with the Left. But there is still yet another stereotype which appears all the time, but only in 1968 does it gain any political colour. It differs from

<sup>4</sup> Zob. J. Błuszkowski, *Cechy dystyktowne stereotypów Żydów w świadomości Polaków*, w: J. Mizgalski, J. Sielski (red.), *Żydzi Częstochowianie. Losy Żydów Częstochowian 1945-2009*, Wyd. Adam Marszałek Toruń 2011, s. 43 i n.

<sup>5</sup> H. Datner-Śpiewak, *Struktura i wyznaczniki postaw antysemitycznych*, w: I. Krzemiński (red.), *Czy Polacy są antysemitami?*, Warszawa 1996, s. 32.

<sup>6</sup> J. Sielski, *Uwarunkowania polityczne w Polsce po II wojnie światowej a mniejszości narodowe na przykładzie społeczności żydowskiej*, w: J. Mizgalski, J. Sielski (red.), *Żydzi Częstochowia-nie. Losy Żydów Częstochowian 1945-2009*, Wyd. Adam Marszałek Toruń 2011, pp. 72-88.

the others previously mentioned in that it has a right-wing, nationalist character – that of the “Jew-Zionist”. The political authorities tried to exploit these stereotypes for their political ends by discrediting the Jewish community within Poland. This article ends with the presentation of the last stereotype – the “Jew-Oppositionist”, who is the enemy of the People’s Poland.

In an instrumental manner, the political authorities in Poland exploited these stereotypes, in relation to the political situation, from before the regaining of independence in 1918, as well as after 1945.

Stereotypes, as an analytical category, function in many disciplines within the social sciences and humanities<sup>7</sup>.

The political stereotype can be defined as functioning at the level of popular consciousness, historically, socially and culturally conditioned, comparatively long-lasting emotionally and accepting a form of generalisation or categorisation of a view of political reality<sup>8</sup>.

The stereotype is a natural cognitive barrier, resulting from the perceptual limitation of the human mind. The stereotype belongs to a sphere of ideas and beliefs. “The following features are characteristics of stereotypes: a) its objects are groups of people and the relationships between them, b) it is acquired through a process of socialisation and constitutes an expression of public opinion c) it has an emotional charge, d) it is either totally contrary to facts or only partly in accordance with them, e) it is long-lasting and immune to change, always connected to a word (a name). The main, active elements of stereotypes are emotional and behavioural factors”<sup>9</sup>.

The stereotype of Jews has a heterogeneous character, alternating through positive, indifferent and negative meanings. They contain internally conflicting descriptions and evaluations. In the imagination of Poles, the Jews are a religious people but, simultaneously, they are pointed out as religious fanatics – hence, religiously intolerant. Poles see their intellectual culture in a similar manner. On the one hand, Jews are talented clever and educated, making an essential contributions to world science and cultural. But, on the other hand, they see Jews as prone to mysticism and superstition. Poles perceive the similarly when it comes to business. They consider them good business people, rich, frugal, enterprising, hardworking and thrifty. But, they also point out their faults – meanness, greed, craftiness, shrewdness and wishing to profit at the cost of someone else.

From a psychological-characteristic viewpoint, the assessment of individuals contains similar contradictions. On the one hand, they are perceived as ambitious, active, prudent and disciplined. On the other hand, Poles consider them closed, conceited, devious, unfriendly, cowardly and vindictive.

<sup>7</sup> Zob. różne definicje stereotypu związane z naukami społecznymi i humanistycznymi: m. in. J. Mizgalski, *Tożsamość polityczna. Studium zjawiska*, Wyd. nauk. UMK Toruń 2008, p.66 i n; J. Błuszkowski, *Stereotypy narodowe w świadomości Polaków. Studium socjologiczno-politologiczne*, Warszawa 2003.

<sup>8</sup> C. Maj, *Stereotyp polityczny*, w: W. Sokół, M. Żmigrodzki (red.), *Encyklopedia politologii. Teoria polityki*, t.1. Zakamycze Kraków 1999, p. 272-273.

<sup>9</sup> J. Mizgalski, *Tożsamość polityczna...*, p.68.

The co-existence of opposing elements in the perception of Jews results in two stereotypes – positive and negative. Negative stereotypes have the character of antisemitic prejudice. The antisemitic content can be seen in reference to the identity of Jews as a people. They are perceived as being isolationist, cohesive, considering themselves as the chosen people and displaying a desire to rule over the world<sup>10</sup>. Within the political dimension, Jews are regarded as a group holding power, being able to worm its way into political elites and, at the same time, everything that is bad in politics being attributed to this group. It is perceived as foreign politically and not a legitimate political power, e.g. Polish.

Neutral elements of the stereotype of Jews, clearly dominant in the evaluation dimension, attest to the appearance of unidentifiable antisemitism. At the level of social attitudes, a scant number of people in Poland declare antisemitic views, but at the same time they refrain from commenting on positive features<sup>11</sup>.

The meaning of every political stereotype depends upon it becoming known within public opinion, through society or a part of society having a specific view of the political reality. An indispensable element of stereotypical perception is the division between “us” and “them”. This division is strengthened emotionally by “labels”, which describe one and the other. Here, a large judgmental element of political stereotypes can be seen<sup>12</sup>.

Joanna Tokarska-Bakir differentiates between two types of stereotypes which, due to the number of victims, are linked to pogroms. The first is connected to the accusation that Jews murder Christian children. The second is the so-called Jew-Bolshevik. As some have estimated, during the years 1918-1921, it claimed 50,000-200,000 victims. In 1941, the Jew-Bolshevik accusation was the pretext for the Jedwabne pogrom<sup>13</sup>.

### ***The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* as the Basis for Political Antisemitism**

All highlighted stereotypes in this article, the leftist as well as the rightist-nationalist, derive from the book *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. This hoax strengthened and spread political antisemitism. Admittedly, the “Jew-revolutionary” stereotype was formed earlier than the apocryphal *Protocols*..., but was later strengthened by the “Jew-Communist” myth in the *Protocols*.... For this reason, in my opinion, it is also worth listing, briefly, the characteristic traits of this hoax and its significant role.

Political antisemitism, which is the basis for the political stereotyping of Jews, is clearly present for the first time in the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. It first appeared as an article in the St.Petersburg newspaper *Znamia* in 1903, and later in book form in 1905. The work was the creation of the Russian Bureau of Security, specifically its police department<sup>14</sup>. The *Protocols*... were presented as authentic and as direct evidence of a worldwide Jewish conspiracy. The authenticity of the *Protocols* was first challenged in 1909 by the French aristocrat A. du Chayla, whereas the crucial act of demystification, from the point of literary journalism, was by Ph.Graves in *The Times* (1921)<sup>15</sup>.

<sup>10</sup> See. J. Błuszkowski, *Cechy dystyktowne...*, pp. 54-55.

<sup>11</sup> Ibidem, p. 55.

<sup>12</sup> C. Maj, *Stereotyp polityczny...*, p. 273.

<sup>13</sup> J. Tokarska-Bakir, Żydzi czarni i czerwoni, „Gazeta Wyborcza” 21-22 lipiec 2012, p. 29.

<sup>14</sup> Wiele informacji na temat żydokomuny zaczerpnąłem z pozycji P. Śpiewaka, *Żydokomuna. Interpretacje historyczne*, Wyd. Czerwone i Czarne Warszawa 2012; D. Pipesa, *Potęga spisku*, BEJ Service Warszawa 1998; L. Zdybela, *Idea spisku i teorie spiskowe w świetle analiz krytycznych i badań historycznych*, Wyd. UMCS Lublin 2002.

<sup>15</sup> L. Zdybel, op. cit., p. 319.

The American antisemite and industrialist, Henry Ford, distributed the *Protocols* around the world. He considered that Jews were destroying his country, were controlling the press, the trade unions, the banks, promoting jazz, alcohol and communism<sup>16</sup>. Ford's idea of the "international Jew" contributed to the popularity of the *Protocols* around the world, as well as becoming one of the basic elements of Hitler's view of the world and Nazi historiography, the source of its political symbols and genocidal practices.

According to Hitler, Jews, not having a country of their own and not being able to wage "civilised" war with the aim of acquiring territory, created secret and treacherous methods of taking control of countries "from within". The "philosophy and ethics" of *Mein Kampf*<sup>17</sup> propagates their aim of creating, in Palestine, in essence, not a state, but a "headquarters" through which to manipulate the entire world.

No book, after 1918, gained such a widespread distribution. It was publicly discussed in Germany, in Switzerland, the United States and in Poland. In Germany, to 1933, it was reprinted thirty six times. It was intended to make the masses aware of how great a threat was posed by the Jewish community and by, particularly, communism.

In London, in 1919, *The Times* posed the question of whether Bolshevik governments in Russia and all the disasters caused by them could be interpreted as Jewish revenge and a Jewish desire to rule over the world. The *Protocols* was also often published in Muslim, Asian and, of course, above all, in European countries.

The popularity of the *Protocols* confirmed the conviction that Bolshevism and the Jews had much in common. It is possible to accept the theory that the myth of Jew-Communists arose in this way. The credibility of this myth was strengthened by events in the spring of 1919, when the first independent communist republic arose outside of Russia.

British writer, Nasta Weber, claimed that there existed a worldwide Jewish conspiracy, that the case of Russia as well as Hungary justified the acceptance of a simple equation: Jews equal communism. Head of the Hungarian commissars at the time was Bela Kun, a Jewish soldier. His security chief was Otto Klein. The majority of members of the government, the Commissariat, were Jews<sup>18</sup>.

"A new Jerusalem is materialising on the banks of the Danube, born from the brain of Karl Marx and built by Jewish hands and revived by very old thinking. The Jews' messianic dream has endured since time immemorial, the dream of a perfect city in which there will be neither rich nor poor, which will be ruled with excellent justice and equality. This myth has never ceased to feed the imagination of Israel"<sup>19</sup>. P. Śpiewak provides an interesting commentary to this quotation: "It does not appear that the authors of the book supported the myth of Jew-Communists, albeit that the future of Europe is most closely associated with eternal Jewish suffering and Jewish messianism which found expression in Bolshevism"<sup>20</sup>.

Two great ideologies – Zionism and communism- dominated the heads of many politicians. The ideas of Jew-Communists and Zionism found strong foundations in Poland as well as in all of Central Europe, from Germany, through Poland and Hungary, even to Rumania.

<sup>16</sup> P. Śpiewak, *Żydokomuna...*, p.16.

<sup>17</sup> Zob. E. Grodziński, *Czytając Hitlera*, „Społeczeństwo Otwarte" 1992, nr 5; idem, *Filozofia Adolfa Hitlera w Mein Kampf*, Wyd. Ethos, Warszawa-Olsztyn 1992.

<sup>18</sup> P. Śpiewak, *Żydokomuna...*, pp. 18-19.

<sup>19</sup> J. Tharaud, J. Tharaud, *Quand Israël est roi*, Paris 1921, p. 220, cyt. za P. Śpiewak, *Żydokomuna...*, p.19.

<sup>20</sup> P. Śpiewak, *Żydokomuna...*, p. 19.

### The “Jew-Revolutionary” Stereotype

In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Jews were perceived by Polish nationalists as cosmopolitans, as individuals who could not be trusted, because they did not exploit their talents for the good of the country, but for their own egotistical purpose. When the new, ideological idea of socialism arose, the stereotype of the Jew was linked to the Jew-socialist or revolutionary. It established the idea that socialism was foreign to Polish culture and that the Jew, here, felt very comfortable as a citizen of the world.

In Russia and in the Congress Kingdom of Poland, tsarist politics was the enemy of the Jews. Inspired by the ruling elite, specifically in Russia, this quite often led to pogroms in which many Jews perished. The most intensive anti-Jewish events took place following the announcement of the tsarist liberation manifesto on 17th October 1905. The Tsar conceded political freedom, equality before the law, elections to the Duma and an end to repression. Pogroms in Russia gave rise to revenge, with many young Jews taking the revolutionary road. Many of them became involved in political movements of a revolutionary character. The 1905 revolution was the turning point.

According to Marx, the proletariat did not have a homeland and, hence, had no nationalist character. In the name of social justice, Jews opposed a nationalist spirit in the interests of the non-nationalist proletariat. After 1905, in Russia and in the Congress Kingdom of Poland, an animated political movement arose amongst Jews. Jewish political parties were established. Jewish politics became democratised. The intensive activity of the Jews and their political parties was noticed by Polish and Russian politicians and this caused anxiety within their own independent politics.

Within the Congress Kingdom of Poland, the culminating point of dislike of the Jews was the elections to the IV Duma which were won by Roman Dmowski's rival, Michał Jagiełło, a member of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS)-Left and a supporter of Jewish electors. From that time, the National Democrats began a boycott of the Jewish population, treating the Jewish question as the most important issue “of our internal lives”<sup>21</sup>.

The ethical issue remained politicised, a sign equating Jews with “otherness, hostility and the Left. Leftism was pinned on the Jews. The PPS and liberal parties were branded as Jewish. Assigning a Jewish connection or Jewish characteristics to any group became a way of delegitimising opponents in Polish politics. As a consequence, both the Bund and the Social Democrats, in the Congress Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, opposed the idea of an independent Poland.

As the result of hostility towards them within Russia and within the Congress Kingdom of Poland, Jews ceased to travel along the revolutionary road. According to the estimates of historians, 75% of members of the SDKPiL (Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania) were Jews<sup>22</sup>. It was similar in other parties. In the years 1907-1908, one quarter of all those arrested for political crimes were Jews<sup>23</sup>.

The Jew-revolutionary became an important route for many young Jews. Socialism replaced Judaism; religious education became replaced by secular learning. Science and Darwin's theory of evolution replaced the belief in God. This was shocking to traditional Jews. This was a revolt by children against their fathers – it was the nucleus of a revolutionary upheaval. Apart from this, demography, to a large extent, was a factor affecting the participation of Jews in this revolution. At that time, half of the Jewish community consisted of young people (10-29 years old). But it should be remembered here that unemployment was high, and therefore poverty. In many small towns, 50% of the Jewish population relied on charity during Pesach.

<sup>21</sup> P. Śpiewak, *Żydokomuna...*, p. 37.

<sup>22</sup> M. Sobczak, *Stosunek Narodowej Demokracji do kwestii żydowskiej w Polsce w latach 1918-1939*, Wrocław 1998, p.155.

<sup>23</sup> P. Wróbel, *Zarys dziejów Żydów na ziemiach polskich w latach 1880-1918*, Warszawa 1991, p. 24.

As P. Śpiewak writes:

Four factors - a numerically large number of cohorts of young people, a relatively high level of education, a lack of work for educated people and significant areas of poverty - must end, for some, in revolution and, for others, with mass emigration. To this, we can add that socialist ideas gained in popularity at that time. They gave rise to hope and even a certainty of victory. They corresponded with the moral sensitivities of many people. They aroused activism and found fields in which to realise them. Together with this, we must absolutely take note of the alienation of Jews connected with antisemitism and the resultant pogroms<sup>24</sup>.

As Lev Trocki wrote, "A lack of equal rights within the state probably constituted one of the underlying stimuli for discontent with the existing system"<sup>25</sup>, and for a rise to revolutionary action.

### The "Jew-Bolshevik" Stereotype

"Jew-Bolshevik" stereotypes were formed as the result of the Jewish community's considerable stake in the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, and later carried over into Poland as the result of the Polish-Bolshevik war in 1920.

Many politicians considered that the Soviet revolution was managed by Jews. The *de facto* head of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917 was Leon Trocki. Head of the Supreme Council was Jakow Swierdłow. The Council of Commisars in Moscow was steered by Lew Kamieniew (Rozenfeld). The Piotrogradsk Soviet was chaired by Grigorij Zinowiew (Radomyslski), while the Piotrogradsk Czeka was ruled by Mosiej Uritski. Karl Radek (Sobelshon) also held a high-profile position. Even Lenin himself, as some have shown, was at least one-quarter Jewish.

Lenin had said straight out that Jews had saved not only the revolution, but also a new state deprived of clerical cadres. The entry of Jews into the structures of management was a novelty. Russians and Ukrainians noticed their excessive appearance.

The Polish-Bolshevik war significantly deepened the negative image of the Jews as alien to the Polish national identity and as associated with Bolshevism. In press statements and posters, Bolshevism was associated with the Jew. It was the result of stories from soldiers returning from Russia, as well as from refugees. The image was filled with a hatred of Bolshevism and Jewry. In the daily press, the war was not just with Soviet Russia, but also with international Jewry.

In the summer of 1920, during the Bolshevik war, 17,000 Jewish soldiers of the Polish Army were interned in camps in Jabłonna, Modlin and Zegrze. [...] This was a consequence of considering Jewish officers and soldiers of the Polish Army as cowards, as people lacking honour and of lowering the valour of armies<sup>26</sup>.

At that time, an image and nomenclature became widespread of, on the one hand, Jewry, and on the other hand, expressions of Bolshevism and leftism – "Judeo-Bolshevism", "Jewish Bolshevik", "Jew-Comrade", "internationally Jewish", "red Jews", socialist-Jewish-Masons", and the like.

Undoubtedly, the negative stereotype of "Jew-Bolshevik" was strengthened during the inter-War period by the activity of the Polish Communist Party (KPP), whose political program was completely contrary to the independence beliefs of the majority of Poles.

The KPP's program was completely contrary to the interests of Poland. In the name of the People's Poland, they renounced territory east of the Curzon line. In the name of Poles, the Germans were to be given the entire Śląsk region, Gdańsk and Pomorze Nadwiślańska.

<sup>24</sup> P. Śpiewak, *Żydokomuna...*, p. 73.

<sup>25</sup> L. Trocki, *Moje życie. Próba autobiografii*, Warszawa 1930, p. 100.

<sup>26</sup> P. Śpiewak, *Żydokomuna...*, p. 24.

The Polish and Soviet communists had a clearly established goal. The Poles should renounce independence, because Polish businesses were in the hands of capitalists ("Bourgeois-Nobility Poland"), and they aspire to wars, conflicts and create systems which harm society.

The negative "Jew-Bolshevik" stereotype was particularly strongly highlighted on 17th September 1939, the moment that the Soviet army occupied Poland's eastern territories. As well as Byelorussians and Ukrainians employed in the Soviet civil service, there were also Jews. A new perspective had opened up for national minorities. For the Soviet authorities, Poles were an uncertain community. Poles were displaced and dismissed from their employment. Seeing the negative perspectives themselves, they escaped into German-occupied territory. They were often replaced by Jews. Poles considered that their loss of work was the fault of Jews. In a whispering campaign, Jews were portrayed as Soviet agents and the allies. As P. Śpiewak writes:

Poles felt helpless against the Soviet authorities. For this indignity, they could seek revenge on the Jews. As Grodno school students said, refusing to sing the *Internationale*, "We're not protesting against the Soviet authorities or the Red Army, but against the Jews who betrayed us"<sup>27</sup>. This negative image, in the form of the Jew-Bolshevik or Jew-Communist, which arose in the east of the Republic of Poland, spread over the entirety of occupied Poland.

At this time, a negative role was played by the Polish-language newspaper *The Red Flag*, distributed in Lwów. Leftists worked there, mainly Jews. They justified acts of terror and indoctrinated their readers. Those who had emigrated regarded it as part of the "Jewish-Communist family", which promoted lies and was Sovietising Polish culture. After the War, those who had survived returned to Poland in officer's greatcoats<sup>28</sup>.

### The "Jew-Communist" Stereotype

The expression "Jew-Communists" appeared in colloquial language only after World War II. However, this cluster of ideas is also tied to the Communist Party of Poland (KPP). Jews comprised a quite large percentage of the party's membership – around 30%. Additionally, as P. Śpiewak writes, much depended on the region. Poles dominated in Lublin, Jews in Siedlce, Jews and Ukrainians in Chełm. Jews predominated in small towns, Poles and Ukrainians in the villages<sup>29</sup>. There were small towns where organisational cells were entirely Jewish. There were deep divisions within the party itself. Jews felt isolated from the Polish community and from Jewish communities where the decided majority were "Jew-Communists". Jews comprised a large percentage of the active membership – sometimes up to 50%.

The unemployment of the inter-War years forced a choice between two roads. The first was connected to Zionist nationalism, and the majority chose that road. The other road led to communism, which was chosen by a minority because it was risky and costly (e.g. According to Adam Schaff, out of thirty political prisoners, only two were not Jewish.)<sup>30</sup>. It should be added here that, by comparison with offices, schools and the like, the Communist Party was free from antisemitic prejudice. "Behind communism stood the Soviet Union" was a myth built up by the communists themselves.

<sup>27</sup> Ibidem, s. 179; M. Wierzbicki, *Polacy i Żydzi w zaborze sowieckim. Stosunki polsko-żydowskie na ziemiach północno-wschodnich II RP pod okupacją sowiecką (1939-1941)*, Warszawa 2007, p. 253.

<sup>28</sup> P. Śpiewak, *Żydokomuna...*, pp. 184-185.

<sup>29</sup> Ibidem, p. 150.

<sup>30</sup> A. Schaff, *Próba podsumowania*, Warszawa 1999, pp. 98-100.



Another interesting road to communism was presented by Roman Zimand which showed how, for specific Jews, three crucial factors eased their way towards communism. The first factor was a “unusual legalism for this culture, frequently added to case law”, a legalism of faith, that legal action would change reality. The second was the “the special status of so-called assimilated Jews, and the third was the conviction, widespread not only amongst Jews, that the Left, by its very nature, could not be antisemitic”<sup>31</sup>.

The Jews’ road to communism was diverse. Wat explains this simply thus:

They went to the movement because they were not given a good life and they simply wanted a position which would enable them to press on after the revolution. Communism promised a reversal of the hierarchy. [...] Communism promised them promotion and gave them a position when they reached the USSR. There, they became generals, factory managers and, sometimes like Bruno Jasiński (deputy leader of Kirgizstan), almost masters of small states.

Children from refined homes, the educated and intellectuals, wrote Wat, added a dandyism to the movement – or more precisely, nihilism and dandyism. [...] An end to European civilisation seemed obvious. [...] Europe was collapsing, which meant that our civilisation is transitory and dubious. It must be replaced with a new, different, not necessarily prettier or better, order. [...] Communism not only carried a promise, but also a real revolution with its limitless violence and cruelty<sup>32</sup>.

P. Śpiewak cites yet another important argument.

In Poland, things looked a little different. There was not a lot of room to assimilate Jews into Polish society [...]. The Jew could be a fine poet but, to the majority, he would still be an alien, often, too often, a ridiculed Jew. Poland or Poles denied them the right to be there or to belong. [...] Attaining a Polish identity, hospitably open to others, was possible only through progressive and left-wing circles. Often communising or communist. [...] Jews bound up their lives with the radical left, because only there could they feel at home. There they could find people similar to themselves and, there, feel that they were on the right ethical side, standing up to defend people who had been wronged”<sup>33</sup>.

Political conditioning in post-War Poland was connected with giving the Jewish community the privilege of participating in the political authority of the time. The “Jew-Communist” stereotype was transformed into the very strong Jewish-Communism myth. Józef Adelson writes this way on this subject:

An additional stimulus, one of the most important (influencing the deepening conflict), was the admittedly small, but significant participation of Jews in creating the new system of power. Antisemitic propaganda often exploited this fact, arousing a feeling of chauvinism amongst part of society. The Jew-Communist image was repeated, with the accusation of having the task of destroying the Polish-nationalist opposition. How strongly this propaganda influenced social awareness is attested to by the fact that, in some circles, this image lingers to this day<sup>34</sup>.

The Jew-communist stereotype had its origins in the pre-War right-wing and, soon after the War, was adopted by opposition forces to the People’s government. For that reason, a considerable section of society identified Jews with the new system of power. In many incidents, an attack on Jews became an attack on the authorities (the pogrom on Jews in Parczew on the 5<sup>th</sup> February 1946 could be interpreted this way when, in broad daylight, a group of armed resistance murdered a large group of Jews).

<sup>31</sup> R. Zimand, *Piołun i popiół*, w: A. Michnik (opr.), *Przeciw antysemityzmowi*, t. II, Kraków 2010, p. 1132.

<sup>32</sup> P. Śpiewak, *Żydokomuna...*, pp.164-165.

<sup>33</sup> Ibidem, p. 167.

<sup>34</sup> J. Adelson, *W Polsce zwanej Ludową*, (w:) *Najnowsze dzieje Żydów w Polsce*. Red. J. Tomaszewski, PWN Warszawa 1993, p. 400.

Attitudes in the government and within society were divergent and this was connected with the attitude towards the Jews' role in the contemporary political authority. Over-representation of the Jewish community in the political elite of the time, particularly in the secret service, was exceptionally evident. This caused an enmity, above all in society and also in a large section of the political elite, which manifested itself in the form of antisemitism. An image was formed of Jews as internal enemies, assigning them the role of communist oppressors of the Polish nation.

In 1956, there were accusations that, in proportion to their number in society, there was a disproportionate number of them involved with the authorities and that they abused their power in fighting against Polish national identity<sup>35</sup>. As a rule, there was a demand that Jews be dismissed from state and political positions. For example, in Szczecin, it was demanded that Elias Koton, head of the Department of Public Security (UB), be dismissed<sup>36</sup>.

The community, holding the authorities to account, sometimes moved onto the streets. Incidents occurred where Jews were beaten.

The over-representation of the Jewish community within the political authority of the time was the result of, among other reasons, the large number of them in managerial positions, particularly in the security apparatus and at the very peaks of power. Returning from the Soviet Union, communist Jews identified with the prevailing political system and were eagerly accepted into the party, state and military apparatus, above all, due to a lack of their own political cadres. This gave rise to a return of the "Jew-Communist" stereotype which, in times of political crisis, was exploited by political opponents.

### The "Jew-Zionist" Stereotype

The Polish Jew had two political roads. The first was connected with Zionist nationalism and the majority chose this road. The second led to communism. I would like, now, to outline that first road in the context of political antisemitism.

The "Jew-Zionist" stereotype was, above all, used in conspiracy theories such as that of wanting to rule the world from a headquarters in Israel. In Poland, that stereotype was exploited in March 1968.

March 1968 became a simple continuation of the politics of the dogmatists (the Natoline faction). Their program was adopted by the "partisans" of Mieczysław Moczar. As an entire consequence, the "Jew-Zionist" became the enemy of the People's Poland, who infested the high positions of the party, of the political, military and security services elite. We have a simple continuation here - the conspiracy theory and now the "Jew-Zionist" becoming the pretext for internal battles over political leadership in Poland between the "partisan" group of Mieczysław Moczar and that of Władysław Gomułka.

On the other hand, the "Jew-Zionist" became a scapegoat upon whom you could lay the blame for everything bad. Namely, the "Jew-Zionist" was guilty of all the evil that ruled over Poland – above all, for Stalinism. And so the aggression of crowds was directed at the "Jew-Zionist" and this led to some very aggressive behaviour aimed towards the Jewish population<sup>37</sup>.

<sup>35</sup> See. further L. Olejnik, *Polityka narodowościowa Polski w latach 1944-1960*, Łódź 2003, pp. 416-425.

<sup>36</sup> J. Mieczkowski, *Zarys dziejów szczecińskiego oddziału Towarzystwa Społeczno-Kulturalnego Żydów*, (w:) *Żydzi szczecińscy. Tradycja i współczesność*. Red. K. Kozłowski i J. Mieczkowski, Szczecin 2004, 59.

<sup>37</sup> See. im. in. E. Krasucki, *Żydowski Marzec '68 w Szczecinie*, wyd. TSKŻ - Oddział w Szczecinie, Szczecin 2008, p. 18 in.

The entire provocation of March 1968 was planned and prepared by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW), the responsible minister being Mieczysław Moczar<sup>38</sup>. The beginning of the events of 1968 should be linked to the Six Day War between Israel and Egypt. The Polish media described it as Israeli aggression against Egypt. Factually, it was different. In May 1967, Egypt, supported by Syria, Jordan and the Warsaw Pact countries, prepared to attack Israel. However, on 5<sup>th</sup> June 1967, Israel pre-emptively attacked and, in a lightning six-day war, crushed the armies of the Arab countries. The Jewish community did not hide its preference and rejoiced in Israel's victory. As a result, the community was stigmatised as an enemy of the People's Poland because it went against the socialist state's official propaganda line. The political secret police had much to do. The "Jew-Zionist" stereotype became an enemy of the People's Republic of Poland (PRL). "Spontaneous rallies" in work places condemned Israel and the Polish Jewish community as being disloyal to the government and to society.

In June 1967, Władisław Gomułka spoke at the Trade Unions Congress in Warsaw. It was a characteristic speech. He called upon the Jewish community to define itself – was it pro the People's Poland or pro Israel? The Jewish community, which do not condemn the State of Israel, was compared by Gomułka to a fifth column who, according to the First Secretary, was allied with Israel, the aggressor. The vision of a Jewish community was expressed here with all grandeur. The Jewish community was a fifth column which "underhandedly schemed" for Israel and for imperialist countries. There was support for the already commenced purges of state, political and military institutions, as well as the media.

On 28th June 1967, a list of 328 "Zionists" was submitted to a court of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW). The list contained 76 writers and journalists, 57 employees of the central state administration and 51 economic administration employees<sup>39</sup>. The most zealous battle against "Zionists" was undertaken by the Polish Communist Party (PZPR) itself, removing all Jews, often under entirely false pretexts. A significant pretext in heightening the antisemitic purge was the staging of Adam Mickiewicz's *Dziadów* (*Forefather's Eve*), directed by Kazimierz Dejmek, staged at the National Theatre in Warsaw as one of the events celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution. However, the production contained several anti-Russian sentiments – that was how the People's government regarded it and it decided to remove the play from the theatre. Following the last performance, a group of around 250 people headed to Mickiewicz's monument. The police force was activated and arrested thirty five participants in the march. Adam Michnik and Henryk Szlajfer informed the *Le Monde* correspondent, Bernard Margueritte, of the entire incident. Both students were expelled and were investigated for contacts with foreign journalists.

Students decided to protest against these sanctions. On 8<sup>th</sup> March 1968, they gathered at Warsaw University. This was the culminating point of the anti-Zionist campaign. Incidents there were used a direct pretext to put Zionists on trial<sup>40</sup>. The Security Service (SB) increased its investigations into all the Jewish community's disloyalties against the government's official political line<sup>41</sup>.

<sup>38</sup> See. P. Osęka, M. Zaremba, *Wojna po wojnie, czyli polskie reperkusje wojny sześciodniowej*, „Polska 1944/45-1989, t. IV, 1999, s. 226-230 czy D. Stola, *Kampania antysyjonistyczna w Polsce 1967-1968*, ISP PAN Warszawa 2000, pp. 292-313.

<sup>39</sup> L. Sowa, *Historia polityczna Polski 1944-1991*, Wyd. Literackie Kraków 2011, p. 335.

<sup>40</sup> E. Krasucki, op. cit., p. 23.

<sup>41</sup> Ibidem, p. 23 i n.

On 11<sup>th</sup> March 1968, a concentrated propaganda attack commenced in the media, exposing the Stalinist and Jewish roots of the instigators of the student riots. It can be said that, from 1967, Marxism began collapsing as the leading ideology of the nationalists (political party nationalism)<sup>42</sup>. There was a call for a return to the traditional Polish values of pre-War nationalism (the rhetoric of Nationalist and Catholic writings)<sup>43</sup>.

In concluding a discussion of the events of 1967-1968, it should be stated that, like in 1956, the Jewish community was only used as a pretext to battle for political power in Poland. Like before, this mechanism was repeated. The "Jew-Zionist" became the main enemy of the People's Poland – disloyal to the political line, dominating senior positions in the party, political, military and security services elite. They had become political saboteurs (a fifth column as Władysław Gomułka stated in his address) – a full-blown "conspiracy theory". The "Jew-Zionist" became the pretext for an internal party battle for political leadership in Poland, between Mieczysław Moczar's "partisans" and Władysław Gomułka's grouping.

On the other hand, the "Jew-Zionist" was a scapegoat upon whom all things bad could be laid. He became guilty for all the evil that plagued Poland – above all, Stalinism (the "Jew-Stalinist" stereotype was not used very often). Mob aggression was directed towards him, which led to very aggressive behaviour towards Jewish people. As a result, in an atmosphere of witch-hunt and uncertainty as to the future (the anti-Zionist campaign), Polish Jews started to leave the country - at that time, around 15,000 Jewish Polish citizens.

### The "Jew-Oppositionist" Stereotype

This stereotype was already initiated in Soviet Russia by the end of the 1930's. It followed the abandonment of the ethnic equality policy. Jews began to be moved out of their positions in the final phase of the great purges.

It was seen emphatically in the new manner of legitimising the Soviet system, which referred to the Greater-Russian character and which began in the first days of the war with Germany. In a speech on 7th November 1941, Stalin invoked the great Greater Russian and Russian leaders - Aleksander Newski, Dymitri Doński, Aleksander Suworow, Michał Kutuzow – but not the soldiers and leaders of the Red Army.

On the front page of the *Prawda* weekly, the banner "Proletariat of the World Unite" disappeared and was replaced with the words "Death to the German Invaders". In 1944, the national anthem ceased to be the *Internationale* and was replaced with *Song of the Homeland*. The internationalist-cosmopolitanist myth became a thing of the past. Its place was taken by the old Greater-Russian patriotism<sup>44</sup>.

The then Communist Party First Secretary, Władysław Gomułka, wanted to copy, slowly in Poland, what Stalin had done. After a meeting with Stalin in 1948, he wrote him a letter criticising the party's personnel policy, where the upper links of the state and party apparatus were filled by Jewish comrades, a section of whom did not feel connected with the Polish nation<sup>45</sup>.

<sup>42</sup> Ibidem, s. 25; M. Zaremba, *Komunizm, legitymizacja, nacjonalizm. Nacjonalistyczna legitymizacja władzy komunistycznej w Polsce*, ISP PAN Warszawa 2005, s. 352.

<sup>43</sup> See. im. in. D. Pałka, *Kościół katolicki wobec Żydów w Polsce międzywojennej*, NOMOS Kraków 2008.

<sup>44</sup> P. Śpiewak, *Żydokomuna...*, p. 101.

<sup>45</sup> A. L. Sowa, *Historia polityczna Polski 1944-1991*, Wyd. Literackie, Kraków 2011, p. 124.

These were the first signals of Stalin's new ethnicity policy regarding Jewish party comrades. In accordance with the accepted course, over the following years (1950 onwards) Jews started being eliminated from positions of power. The signal was a civic vetting committee which recommended limiting the exhibiting of Jewish objects in the Oświęcim-Brzezinka (Auschwitz-Birkenau) State Museum, replacing them with the martyrology of "Polish citizens". In 1951, there was an increase in the phenomenon whereby party comrades changed their Jewish surnames for Polish ones<sup>46</sup>.

In Soviet Russia, antisemitic moves began which, on Stalin's orders, also began in the satellite states. The climax was the trial of Rudolf Slansky (Rudolf Salzman), General Secretary of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party, as well as ten other high ranking Jewish civil servants. They were charged with treason and with spying for Israel. It was only Stalin's death in 1953 which slowed down the removal of Jewish state and party functionaries, but not entirely (amongst Jewish doctors were those who treated Stalin).

In Poland, 1956 was a watershed year in the perception of Jews. A section of those in political power (the so-called "dogmatists") exploited the "Jew-Communist" stereotype to blame the Jews for all the evils of the past.

The situation of the Jewish community, in those years, was complex. On the one hand, they were considered enemies of the Polish national identity and allied to the Soviet Union. In particular, this stereotype was visible in society and, at the same time, was exploited by the political opposition. On the other hand, in 1956, in the top echelons of power, two factions formed – the *Pulawian* and the *Natoline*, which competed for political power. The *Natolines*, as they were called by their political opponents, were dogmatists and, due to their dislike of the intelligentsia, were also considered "louts". They were also often branded as antisemites.

Proposals put forward to eliminate Jews from areas of power were supposed to authenticate the national character, to turn attention away from other substantial issues, to blame the Jews for all the evils of the past and, in the process, free the Communist Party from any responsibility for them<sup>47</sup>.

The *Pulawians* wanted to liberalise the Community party and the country. They contributed to Gomulka's rise to power. At the same time, they were referred to as "Jews", due to the background of some of their members<sup>48</sup>. This multiple perception of Jews, once as opponents of the Polish national identity, and then as allies of political change, caused Gomulka to move away from the *Pulawians*, crossing slowly to the side of the dogmatists. The *Pulawians* were accused by Gomulka of revisionism. As a last resort, in 1967-1968, he himself accused the Jewish community of sabotaging Poland.

The Jewish community, in those years, appeared as a group "holding power" and this led to the rise of the concept of a "conspiracy theory". The Jew-Communists were a group wishing to rule Poland and Poland needed to take a stand. On the other hand, accusing them of responsibility for all that was politically and ideologically (Stalinism) bad was making them a scapegoat because, in the popular political consciousness, it was the Jews who were guilty of bringing Stalinism to Poland and for its strengthening. And, indeed, that aggression towards the Jewish community was often visible (beatings, the destruction of Jewish property).

<sup>46</sup> Ibidem, p. 140.

<sup>47</sup> K. Kersten, *Polacy - Żydzi - komuniści*, [w:] K. Kersten, *Pisma rozproszone*, Wyd. Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2006, p. 319.

<sup>48</sup> Zob. szerzej W. Jedlicki, *Chamy i Żydzi*, Paryż 1963; A. Zambrowski, *Rewelacje wysane z palca, czyli pulawianie i natolińczycy w 1956 roku*, „Warszawskie Zeszyty Historyczne” 1988, z. 2, pp. 49-78.

As a result of this aggression and the politics of the time, as well as a lack of any realistic perspectives, around 40,000 Jewish Polish citizens left the country. Again, the image of the Jew changed in Poland. The “Jew-Communist” stereotype disappeared and was replaced by the image of the “Jew-Oppositionist” – an opponent of the government. The change from “Jew-Communist” to “Jew-Oppositionist” provoked Gomułka, whom the *Puławian* group had at first accepted. He then ceased the October Reforms and, gradually, removed them from power, accusing them of revisionism. As a result, a very visible group of party intellectuals lined up in opposition to the government (L. Kołakowski, Michnik, Kuroń, Modzelewski, and others). A stereotype was created - The Jew, enemy of the People’s Poland.

The events of 1967-1968 highlighted all the more the stereotype of Jews as enemies of the People’s Poland. Since I have already described some of the events of those years in the section devoted to the “Jew-Zionist” stereotype, I will now only remind the reader of the events associated with the Jewish community.

From a technical point of view, it is possible to identify the “Jew-Zionist” stereotype with the “Jew-enemy of the People’s Poland” stereotype, which is the “Jew-Oppositionist”. The events of 1968 were a turning point in the perception of the Jewish community. Firstly, a large section of that community left the country and the remaining individuals stayed visible thanks to Polish political antisemitism. Some columnists and others highlighted Jews engaged in opposition activity, attaching a Zionist label to them.

Andrzej L. Sowa quotes a statement by a well-known opposition leader who, in December 1976, informed officers of the Security Service (SB) that he had joined a “nationalist” group, whose activities would be between “Kuron” and “clerical”. In that same conversation, he was supposed to have described KOR (Workers Defence Committee) as a “Jewish-Zionist” group<sup>49</sup>, which most probably referred to Jewish oppositionists, among them being Adam Michnik and lawyers Ludwik Cohn and Aniela Steinsberg.

It can be said that Jewish oppositionists actively entered into the anti-PRL opposition. The names Bronisław Geremek, Ludwik Dorn, Seweryn Blumsztajn and others should also be added here.

Finally, it should also be added that this community was not only connected with the “Kuron” current, but with other opposition currents as well. Author of one of the latest studies of Polish history, Andrzej L. Sowa, tackles this issue and presents an interesting conclusion:

In the end, Michnik, and later supporting him Kuroń, resigned from editing *Głos* (*The Voice*), which had been taken over by a group of activists (among them Antoni Macierewicz, Piotr Naimski, Jakub Karpiński, Ludwik Dorn) who were moving more and more towards “Polish national traditions” and whose most important task was to expose them and to fight for independence. What is interesting from a psychological viewpoint is that some of them, themselves, were Jewish, which demonstrates just how unreliable is the categorisation of people and the maintenance of rigid divisions<sup>50</sup>.

<sup>49</sup> A. L. Sowa, op. cit., p. 418.

<sup>50</sup> Ibidem, p. 425.

## Conclusion

In analysing the stereotypes of Jews which appeared in Poland, in the context of political antisemitism, it should be noted the story started with the "Jew-revolutionary" stereotype, which was introduced in this paper as an opposition to the political authority of the time – tsarist Russia. Likewise, the last stereotype, the "Jew-Oppositionist" also has that character of opposition to the current political authority – the PRL government.

All the stereotypes presented have an internal bipolarity, and sometimes a multi-polarity, influencing different sides (classes) of society.

The first stereotype, the "Jew-Revolutionary", was perceived differently, depending upon the view of a particular section of society. By the political authorities of tsarist Russia, it was seen as a real danger, hence negatively. On the other hand, the nationalists perceived the "Jew-Revolutionary" as a foreigner who could not be trusted, who did not use his talents for the good of the nation, but instead for a socialist ideal which was alien to Polish culture, and that the Jew felt himself to be a citizen of the world. Yet, this stereotype was accepted positively by the left-wing of Polish society.

The second stereotype, the "Jew-Bolshevik", has two clearly opposing vectors. Associated with the Soviet authorities, it was positive for the government and negative for Polish society. As a result of the Polish-Bolshevik war, the "Jew-Bolshevik" was perceived as an all important enemy. Following the Red Army's occupation of the eastern borderlands in 1939, the "Jew-Bolshevik" was hated as the one who robbed the Polish community of position and work within the Belarus and Ukraine administrations.

The third stereotype, the "Jew-Communist", also has two clearly opposing vectors. On the one hand, it was positively connected with the communist government. But, on the other hand, the majority of society perceived Jews negatively through the cliché that they assumed high positions at the cost of Poles and that they were responsible for Stalinism, a political trend which captivated the majority of Polish people.

The next stereotype, the "Jew-Zionist" became the main enemy of the People's Poland - disloyal to the official line, controlling high positions within the party, political, military and security services elite and (from Gomułka's speech) had become a political saboteur (fifth column). On the other hand, the "Jew-Zionist" was the scapegoat on whom everything bad could be blamed. It was responsible for all the evil pervading Poland, above all, Stalinism, as well as for the student demonstrations. According to the political authorities, "Jew-Stalinists and Zionists" inspired children to demonstrate against the People's Government. Mob aggression was directed against this. This stereotype, by comparison with those previously mentioned, was perceived only negatively in Poland, because the political authorities of the time saw the stereotype as the enemy. A large section of society believed the government, and directed its hostility against the stereotype.

However, the events of 1968, connected with the student riots, began changing the perception of the Jewish community within Poland. A new stereotype was born – the "Jew-Oppositionist", the enemy of the People's Poland, but positively received, by a section of society, as associated with the political opposition.

## **Summary**

In this paper, the author has endeavoured to present stereotypes connected with political antisemitism shaped in Poland before independence in 1918 and afterwards. The first stereotype connected with political antisemitism was the “Jew-Revolutionary”. The next stereotype which can be distinguished was the “Jew-Bolshevik”, transforming into the “Jew-Communist” stereotype. All the above outlined stereotypes were connected with the Left. But there is one other stereotype which appears all the time, but does not, until 1918, take on a significant political colour. Unlike the previous stereotypes, it has a right-wing-nationalist character – the “Jew-Zionist”. The political authorities endeavoured to exploit these stereotypes for their political ends and to discredit the Jewish community in Poland. This paper ends with the final stereotype – the “Jew-Oppositionist”, who is the enemy of the People’s Poland.

Depending upon the political situation, the political authorities, in an instrumental manner, used these stereotypes before independence in 1918, as well as after 1945.

Analysing the stereotypes of Jews which appeared in Poland in the context of antisemitism, the history around the “Jew-Revolutionary” should be noted. It was presented, in this paper, as the opponent of the political authority of the time – tsarist Russia. At the same time, the “Jew-Oppositionist” also had the character of an opponent of the political authority of the time – the government of the PRL (People’s Republic of Poland).

All the stereotypes presented have an internal bipolarity, and sometimes a multi-polarity, influencing different sides (classes) of society.